

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

161742Z Oct 03

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 006622

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2013

TAGS: [PREL](#), [ECON](#), [IZ](#), [JO](#)

SUBJECT: KING, GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY SUPPORT IRAQ
RECONSTRUCTION AND TRAINING FOR IRAQI POLICE; ISLAMISTS
STRONGLY OPPOSE

Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b)(d)

SUMMARY

1. (U) Both Prime Minister Abul Ragheb and King Abdullah continue to publicly express their support for direct Jordanian involvement in reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including security-related training. The Jordanian Cabinet formally endorsed October 14 a contract for the training in Jordan of up to 32,000 members of the Iraqi police. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), on the other hand, continues to call on the GOJ to refrain from actions, including training and the dispatch of troops, that would "legitimize" or facilitate the American occupation of Iraq. End Summary.

THE GOVERNMENT SAYS "YES" TO IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION . . .

2. (U) Jordanian Prime Minister Abul Ragheb recently held a series of publicized meetings with visiting Iraq officials in which he stressed Jordan's commitment to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. On October 9, Abul Ragheb met with Iraqi Minister of Transportation Bahnam Bolis to discuss transport and economic cooperation between Jordan and Iraq. Similarly, during the recent Jordan Economic Forum, Abul Ragheb met with Iraqi Housing and Reconstruction Minister Bayan Zubeidi to promote cooperation between the private sectors of the two countries and joint Jordanian-Iraqi projects in the rebuilding of Iraq.

3. (C) Abul Ragheb was careful to emphasize to the press that Jordan wants to see a complete return of sovereignty to the Iraqi people and the (eventual) withdrawal of all foreign forces. But these recent meetings, like Abul Ragheb's prior talks with members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), clearly demonstrate the GOJ's continued strong backing of CPA reconstruction efforts.

. . . AND "YES" TO POLICE TRAINING . . .

4. (U) Attending the World Economic Forum's East Asia Summit in Singapore October 13, King Abdullah publicly voiced his support for the training of Iraqi police in Jordan. The King characterized the police training as a positive step in the restoration of normal life for Iraqis, and he stressed Jordan's commitment to help the Iraqi people by "rehabilitating" its professionals from various fields. The King drew the line, however, on sending troops into Iraq, saying that "I don't think that any country that borders Iraq should play an active role inside of Iraq."

5. (C) On October 14, the Jordanian Cabinet formally endorsed a contractual agreement signed October 11 between the CPA and the Jordanian Public Security Department (PSD) to provide training in Jordan for up to 32,000 members of the Iraqi police (N.B: two side letters, necessary to make the contract operational, have yet to be signed pending a further round of negotiations to begin October 16). Minister of Information Nabil Sharif told the press that the PSD would carry out the training "in association with the concerned bodies in Iraq," and further stated that the training would "help our Iraqi brothers reinstate order and security to their country."

. . . BUT THE ISLAMISTS SAY "NO"

6. (U) Reflecting its deep opposition to the U.S. presence in Iraq, the IAF has denounced plans to train Iraqi police in Jordan. In a memo sent by the IAF to the Prime Minister around October 6, the IAF called on the GOJ to retract its decision to provide police training. The IAF argued that the offer of training had been coerced by occupation forces as "part of the American-British project to wipe out national resistance." The memo also stated that Iraqi "resistance

fighters" had admonished neighboring countries not to assist the occupation of Iraq and, consequently, the IAF warned that if the GOJ moved forward with its plans, "the battleground might move to Jordan or reach our sons and interests in Iraq."

17. (U) In a similar move, the IAF recently sent another letter to the Prime Minister warning against sending Jordanian forces into Iraq. In the letter, the IAF asserted that it had received information about "secret plans" to dispatch 3,000 Jordanian troops to Baghdad. The IAF leadership branded such a move as "dangerous" and asked the Prime Minister to put out an official statement denying these rumors.

COMMENT

18. (C) The divide between the stance of the King and the government, on one hand, and the IAF, on the other, with respect to security assistance for Iraq shows no signs of narrowing. Although the IAF cannot legitimately claim to speak for a majority of Jordanians, it is trying to tap into a strong public sense of unease about the U.S. presence in Iraq and GOJ moves perceived as assisting that presence. The IAF has not ruled out all cooperation with Iraqis, as evidenced by its non-objection to increased trade between Jordan and Iraq, but only condones "cooperation with legitimate governments that represent the interests of their people and nation, not an occupation that oppresses them, plunders their resources, and confiscates their will." Against this backdrop, the King and his government will have to tread softly in public as they back U.S. efforts to restore security in Iraq.

19. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/>

or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
GNEHM